ITS Roadway Equipment --> Traffic Management Center:
signal fault data
Definitions
signal fault data (Information Flow): Faults reported by traffic signal control equipment.
ITS Roadway Equipment (Source Physical Object): 'ITS Roadway Equipment' represents the ITS equipment that is distributed on and along the roadway that monitors and controls traffic and monitors and manages the roadway. This physical object includes traffic detectors, environmental sensors, traffic signals, highway advisory radios, dynamic message signs, CCTV cameras and video image processing systems, grade crossing warning systems, and ramp metering systems. Lane management systems and barrier systems that control access to transportation infrastructure such as roadways, bridges and tunnels are also included. This object also provides environmental monitoring including sensors that measure road conditions, surface weather, and vehicle emissions. Work zone systems including work zone surveillance, traffic control, driver warning, and work crew safety systems are also included.
Traffic Management Center (Destination Physical Object): The 'Traffic Management Center' monitors and controls traffic and the road network. It represents centers that manage a broad range of transportation facilities including freeway systems, rural and suburban highway systems, and urban and suburban traffic control systems. It communicates with ITS Roadway Equipment and Connected Vehicle Roadside Equipment (RSE) to monitor and manage traffic flow and monitor the condition of the roadway, surrounding environmental conditions, and field equipment status. It manages traffic and transportation resources to support allied agencies in responding to, and recovering from, incidents ranging from minor traffic incidents through major disasters.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
- ST02: Eco-Traffic Signal Timing
- TM03: Traffic Signal Control
- TM04: Connected Vehicle Traffic Signal System
- TM16: Reversible Lane Management
- TM18: Drawbridge Management
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
- Roadway Multimodal Crossing Control
- Roadway Reversible Lanes
- Roadway Signal Control
- TMC Multimodal Crossing Management
- TMC Reversible Lane Management
- TMC Signal Control
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
None |
Communication Solutions
- EU: UTMC Data - UTMC (3)
- US: NTCIP Signal System Masters - SNMPv3/TLS (5)
- US: NTCIP Signal System Masters - SNMPv1/TLS (6)
- US: NTCIP Signal System Masters - SNMPv1 (32)
- AU: TRAFF - AU TRAFF Comms (44)
- Data for Distribution (TBD) - Apache Kafka (44)
- Data for Distribution (TBD) - OMG DDS (44)
- EU: OCIT-O Signal Control - ODG-OCIT-O (44)
- Data for Distribution (TBD) - OASIS MQTT (50)
- Data for Distribution (TBD) - OASIS AMQP (61)
Selected Solution
Solution Description
ITS Application Entity
NTCIP 1202 NTCIP 1210 |
Click gap icons for more info.
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Mgmt
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Facilities
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Security
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TransNet
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Access
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Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
Characteristic | Value |
---|---|
Time Context | Recent |
Spatial Context | Local |
Acknowledgement | True |
Cardinality | Unicast |
Initiator | Source |
Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | False |
Interoperability | Description |
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Local | In cases where an interface is normally encapsulated by a single stakeholder, interoperability is still desirable, but the motive is vendor independence and the efficiencies and choices that an open standards-based interface provides. |
Security
Information Flow Security | ||||
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Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
Rating | Low | High | Moderate | |
Basis | The current conditions of an ITS RE are completely observable, by design. | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. |
Security Characteristics | Value |
---|---|
Authenticable | True |
Encrypt | False |