Archived Data System --> ITS Roadway Equipment:
data collection and monitoring control
Definitions
data collection and monitoring control (Information Flow): Information used to configure and control data collection and monitoring systems.
Archived Data System (Source Physical Object): The 'Archived Data System' collects, archives, manages, and distributes data generated from ITS sources for use in transportation administration, policy evaluation, safety, planning, performance monitoring, program assessment, operations, and research applications. The data received is formatted and tagged with attributes that define the data source, conditions under which it was collected, data transformations, and other information (i.e. meta data) necessary to interpret the data. The archive can fuse ITS generated data with data from non-ITS sources and other archives to generate information products utilizing data from multiple functional areas, modes, and jurisdictions. The archive prepares data products that can serve as inputs to federal, state, and local data reporting systems. The 'Archived Data System' may reside within an operational center and provide focused access to a particular agency's data archives. Alternatively, it may operate as a distinct center that collects data from multiple agencies and sources and provides a general data warehouse service.
ITS Roadway Equipment (Destination Physical Object): 'ITS Roadway Equipment' represents the ITS equipment that is distributed on and along the roadway that monitors and controls traffic and monitors and manages the roadway. This physical object includes traffic detectors, environmental sensors, traffic signals, highway advisory radios, dynamic message signs, CCTV cameras and video image processing systems, grade crossing warning systems, and ramp metering systems. Lane management systems and barrier systems that control access to transportation infrastructure such as roadways, bridges and tunnels are also included. This object also provides environmental monitoring including sensors that measure road conditions, surface weather, and vehicle emissions. Work zone systems including work zone surveillance, traffic control, driver warning, and work crew safety systems are also included.
Included In
This Triple is in the following Service Packages:
This triple is associated with the following Functional Objects:
This Triple is described by the following Functional View Data Flows:
This Triple has the following triple relationships:
| Relationship | Source | Destination | Flow |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interactive | ITS Roadway Equipment | Archived Data System | roadside archive data |
Communication Solutions
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US: NTCIP Data Collection - SNMPv3/TLS (5)
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US: NTCIP Data Collection - SNMPv1/TLS (6)
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(None-Data) - Secure Internet (ITS) (32)
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US: NTCIP Data Collection - SNMPv1 (32)
Selected Solution
US: NTCIP Data Collection - SNMPv1/TLSSolution Description
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ITS Application Entity
NTCIP 1206  NTCIP 1209 |
Click gap icons for more info.
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Mgmt
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Facilities
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Security
IETF RFC 8446 |
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TransNet
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Access
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Note that some layers might have alternatives, in which case all of the gap icons associated with every alternative may be shown on the diagram, but the solution severity calculations (and resulting ordering of solutions) includes only the issues associated with the default (i.e., best, least severe) alternative.
Characteristics
| Characteristic | Value |
|---|---|
| Time Context | Recent |
| Spatial Context | Local |
| Acknowledgement | True |
| Cardinality | Unicast |
| Initiator | Source |
| Authenticable | True |
| Encrypt | True |
| Interoperability | Description |
|---|---|
| Local | In cases where an interface is normally encapsulated by a single stakeholder, interoperability is still desirable, but the motive is vendor independence and the efficiencies and choices that an open standards-based interface provides. |
Security
| Information Flow Security | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability | ||
| Rating | Moderate | Moderate | Low | |
| Basis | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should be kept confidential to minimize attack vectors. While an individual installation may not be particularly impacted by a cyberattack of its sensor network, another installation might be severely impacted, and different installations are likely to use similar methods, so compromising one leads to compromising all. | Control flows, even for seemingly innocent devices, should have MODERATE integrity at minimum, just to guarantee that intended control messages are received. Incorrect, corrupted, intercepted and modified control messages can or will result in target field devices not behaving according to operator intent. The severity of this depends on the type of device, which is why some devices are set MODERATE and some HIGH. | Control flow availability is related to the criticality of being able to remotely control the device. For most devices, this is MODERATE. For purely passive devices with no incident relationship, this will be LOW. All devices should have default modes that enable them to operate without backhaul connectivity, so no device warrants a HIGH. | |
| Security Characteristics | Value |
|---|---|
| Authenticable | True |
| Encrypt | True |